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Public buffer stocks as agricultural output 
price stabilization policy in Ghana
Emmanuel Abokyi1,2*, Henk Folmer2,3 and Kofi Fred Asiedu1
Abstract 
Background: Food price volatility poses widespread risks, from farmers to consumers, notably in developing coun-
tries. Because of its devastating effects on sustainable farming and food security, particularly for the poor, it contin-
ues to be a crucial policy priority. Governments have applied various methods of stabilizing domestic food prices 
including publicly held buffer stocks, import and export tariffs and production supports. This study evaluates Ghana’s 
agricultural output price stabilization policy implemented in the context of the National Buffer Stock Program.
Results: Based on data from the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, we apply the coefficient of variation and the cor-
rected coefficient of variation to analyze the volatility of output prices of maize and rice. The results show that the 
price volatility of maize and rice has declined in the markets where the policy has been implemented but not in the 
non-policy markets.
Conclusion: There is, therefore, empirical evidence that the policy has been successful.
Keywords: Agricultural output, Price volatility, Price stabilization policy, Buffer stock, Coefficient of variation, 
Augmented Dicky–Fuller test, Ghana
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Background
Surges in global food prices continue to be of serious 
concern to governments all over the world, especially in 
developing countries, because of the devastating effects it 
has on food security for the poor and on sustainable pro-
duction of agricultural commodities [1]. When food price 
levels increase, household purchasing power is lowered, 
especially for the poor [2]. However, farmers are often 
delighted with increases in price levels for their farm 
products with the expectation that it provides them with 
higher income [3]. The opposite holds when prices fall. 
While consumers prefer low and producers high price 
levels, volatility—magnitude and direction—ultimately 
results in harmful effects on both producers and consum-
ers [4]. High food price volatility, therefore, is very det-
rimental to every country because it can cause serious 
political, economic and social problems [5].
Price volatility in agricultural commodity markets is 
normal [6]. According to Prakash [7], it is natural and 
instrumental that, when there is a shortage in the sup-
ply of a particular agricultural commodity, its price will 
increase, consumption will decline, and investment in the 
production of the commodity is stimulated. Therefore, 
some level of volatility is needed for commodity mar-
kets to function well [8]. However, it becomes of much 
concern when the magnitude and the frequency of the 
volatility are such that producers and consumers find it 
difficult to cope with them. Sumpsi [9] demonstrates that 
agricultural commodity volatility has negative impacts on 
food security and health. For example, when food prices 
rise sharply, households are likely to respond by eating 
cheaper and less nutritious foods, which can have poten-
tial lifelong effects on the social, physical, and mental 
well-being of millions of people. When children are mal-
nourished, it exposes them to the risk of stunting, under-
weight, morbidity and mortality. In developing countries, 
the risk posed by high food price volatility is precari-
ous for poor households because they spend a substan-
tial proportion of their income on food, and hence price 
volatility poses a very high risk to them. For instance, in 
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Sub-Saharan Africa, poor households spend about 60% of 
their income on food [8]. The nature and magnitudes of 
the effects that food price volatility poses in developing 
countries vary depending inter alia on the specific coun-
try poverty levels [10, 11].
Food price volatility also poses the risk of unsustain-
able farming because of under- or deinvestment. High 
levels of volatility in food prices deter smallholder farm-
ers—who are often risk averse—from making the neces-
sary investments to increase productivity and production 
[3]. Furthermore, banks and other financial institutions 
tend to shy away from giving loans to farmers due to high 
financial risks and default. Consequently, adoption of 
efficient technologies will be low which has consequences 
for agricultural modernization, irrigation, and good agri-
cultural practices. The effect is low productivity and poor 
income levels for farmers [12] which ultimately may have 
consequences for economic growth.
Low prices for agricultural commodities and food price 
volatility can be periodical [1] and thus reduce farmer’s 
household income during periods of glut or harvest time. 
This is especially for crops for which farmers have low or 
no storage capacity or lack the possibility to process into 
other products. In such situations, rural farmers often 
need to sell their farm produce at harvest time which 
results in the underpricing of farm products and makes 
farmers poor [13].
Food price volatility can also lead to political instability 
[14]. Arezki and Brückner [15] in their study across 120 
countries conclude that in low-income countries, when 
food prices increase, political institutions deteriorate 
which is likely to increase the probability of civil conflicts 
and other forms of civil strife, such as anti-government 
demonstrations and riots. Berazneva and Lee [16] found 
that some of the political and social unrest in Africa and 
Asia in 2007 and 2008 was the result of the food price cri-
ses at the time. Bellemare [17] and Schneide [18] report 
that rising food prices have caused political unrest across 
Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East.
Food price volatility may also have macroeconomic 
implications, particularly for imports and inflation. Dur-
ing periods of high food prices, countries often import 
food to supplement local supply which can lead to 
increased demand for foreign currency and consequently 
unfavorable exchange rates. According to Clapp [19], 
high volatility of food prices can result in the devaluation 
of the currency of a country. In Sub-Saharan Africa, this 
risk is aggravated by the fact that most of the countries 
are net importers of food.
Because of its far-reaching implications, reducing 
food price volatility has been a core issue in agricultural 
policy. According to Rashid [20], one of the most widely 
debated agricultural output price stabilization policy 
options is dual pricing implemented through buffer 
stock operations. The dual pricing mechanism involves 
the setting up of ceiling and floor prices in a commodity 
market, i.e., a price band, such that the government can 
intervene when prices are outside of the band/range 
[21]. Within the band, prices are allowed to fluctuate. 
Outside the band, the government intervenes by pur-
chasing produce from farmers, usually during the har-
vesting period, at a fixed price within the band which 
is higher than the prevailing market price. In addition, 
during lean periods when prices are high, the govern-
ment intervenes by selling produce to consumers at a 
lower price than the prevailing price such that prices 
(return into) are kept within the band. This policy was 
adopted by many Asian countries during the Green 
Revolution. In many African countries, stabilization of 
agricultural output prices through buffer stock opera-
tions tends to focus on grains because of their storabil-
ity and because they constitute a large share of the food 
requirements of most rural and urban households.
In Indonesia, the implementation of the buffer stock 
operation is done by a special food and logistics agency 
called the Bandan Urusan Logistik (BULOG). BULOG 
manages a nationwide set of local agencies at the district 
level: the Depot Logistics (DOLOGs). The main func-
tion of the DOLOGs is to store rice for BULOG. BULOG 
procures paddy rice from farmers’ cooperatives as well 
as from private traders. Individual farmers are encour-
aged to establish village cooperatives from which rice is 
purchased to lift the price in rural markets to the floor 
price. BULOG has also been given monopolistic power 
to import rice when domestic production is low and to 
export it when is high [22].
In Zambia, the Zambia Food Reserve Agency (FRA) 
was set up by the government in 1996 to stabilize grain 
prices. FRA, a parastatal strategic food reserve agency, 
buys maize at territorially determined prices that typi-
cally exceed wholesale market prices in the major maize-
producing areas during periods of glut. FRA then stores 
the maize and at the appropriate time, exports it or sells 
it domestically. Prices are determined by tender, auc-
tion, or administratively. In years when there is a deficit 
in production, the FRA imports maize which it sells to 
selected large-scale millers at prices that are below the 
market prices.
In India, buffer stocks are operated by a food grains 
management system. The government is the dominant 
agency in most market operations of grains, such as 
procurement, storage, transport, and distribution. All 
these activities are carried out by the Food Corporation 
of India (FCI), a government agency. However, the pro-
curement price is set by another government agency, the 
Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices (CACP). 
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The CACP bases the price on production costs and 
includes a return to land and family labor.
In Ghana, the 2008 world food crisis led to food secu-
rity concerns and brought to the fore persistent hunger 
[23, 24], agricultural production issues and welfare of 
the citizens as a result of the drastic increases in prices 
of some commonly traded foods such as rice, maize, and 
wheat which rose by 50–75% over a matter of weeks [25]. 
As a response, Ghana introduced its agricultural output 
price stabilization policy consisting of buffer stock opera-
tions and a dual pricing mechanism. The policy has been 
in operation for the past 8 years.
This paper seeks to provide an empirical evaluation 
of this policy in Ghana. The basic question it addresses 
is: has the volatility, highs and lows, of prices of maize 
and rice been reduced, following the implementation of 
buffer stocking and dual pricing? Accordingly, the paper 
shows that buffer stocking can be applied as a means to 
ensuring price stabilization in the agricultural food sys-
tems in Ghana. The paper presents econometric tests for 
the efficacy of public buffer stock operations as reflected 
by reduced price volatility measured by the (corrected) 
coefficient of variation. The intervention involves govern-
ment purchasing maize and rice from farmers through 
agents during periods of glut at a fixed price and re-sell-
ing when prices are high.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follow. “Gha-
na’s agricultural output price stabilization policy” section 
presents a description of the agricultural output price 
stabilization policy implemented in Ghana. “Methods” 
section presents the data, methods and the empirical 
results. Summary and conclusions follow in “Conclusion” 
section.
Ghana’s agricultural output price stabilization 
policy
During the 2007/2008 world food price crisis, the gov-
ernment of Ghana had to import food from the interna-
tional market as domestic food prices were soaring. In 
response, in 2009 the current agricultural output price 
stabilization policy was implemented across the country. 
The policy seeks to stabilize the prices of two key agri-
cultural outputs: rice and maize. The implementation of 
the policy saw the setting up of the National Buffer Stock 
Company (NAFCO). NAFCO was primarily designed to 
stabilize prices of cereals (maize and rice) by smallholder 
farmers, particularly to reduce potential annual gluts that 
characterize maize and rice production. NAFCO pur-
chases excess outputs of these cereals at a fixed (floor) 
price set by government above the open market price 
during the glut period and sells them during the lean 
period. The aim is to insulate farmers against losses, pro-
vide them with assured income, help increase their yields 
and stimulate the expansion of agricultural land and 
inputs to improve production. It is also to provide con-
sumers with a respite when prices of cereals are getting 
too high.
The determination of the floor price is done annually 
by the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA) through 
the Post-Harvest Committee. This committee is made 
up of representatives of farmer associations, NAFCO 
and MoFA. In determining the floor price, the commit-
tee takes into account the cost of production and ensures 
that a minimum of 15 percent or more profit margin is 
added. The purchase of maize and rice is made across 
the different maize growing areas spread across five 
regions in the country with potential spatial differentials 
in the cost of production. However, the committee does 
not take into account local price differentials when set-
ting the floor price [26]. The determination of the ceiling 
price is done by NAFCO taking into consideration the 
prevailing open market price. The purchase of the cere-
als is done by Licensed Buying Agents (LBCs) which are 
private companies. The LBCs purchase the cereals on 
behalf of NAFCO at the floor price determined by the 
Post-Harvest Committee on a commission basis in the 
various rural communities. For every 100 kg bag of maize 
purchased from farmers by LBCs and delivered to the 
NAFCO warehouse, NAFCO pays a percentage of the 
fixed price to the LBCs as a commission. The percentage 
of the commission is determined by taking into consid-
eration the distance of the location where the maize was 
purchased from.
Storage of the cereals is done by NAFCO with the use 
of the GrainPro Cocoon technology. GrainPro Cocoons 
are airtight unsupported rectangular structures made 
of lightweight UV-resistant PVC. The simple two-piece 
Cocoon consists of a top cover, and a floor piece joined 
with a PVC tongue and groove zipper similar to those 
used to close environmental safety suits. Insects trapped 
in the bagged grain expire in a matter of days as a result 
of an increase in carbon dioxide and reduction of oxygen. 
Cocoons are packed folded in a carry bag for transport 
and can be made ready for use in minutes. The technol-
ogy can store bagged agricultural outputs such as grains, 
seeds, cocoa and coffee beans, and others.
Farm price volatility is the extent to which prices of 
farm produce rise or fall beyond the expectations of 
consumers and farmers [27]. In other words, it is the 
unpredictable change in price [28] defined over a spe-
cific period [29]. Von Braun and Tadesse [30] define price 
volatility as the deviation of a price series from its mean. 
This study focuses on two key agricultural outputs: maize 
and rice. The methods we adopt in measuring the output 
price volatility are the coefficient of variation and the cor-
rected coefficient of variation.
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Methods
The ADF test
The data analyzed are real monthly wholesale prices for 
maize and rice reported by the Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture of Ghana. In preparation for the analyses, we 
tested each series for the presence of a unit root using the 
augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) test [31]. The ADF test 
is specified as:
where y is price, t is time, k is the number of lags, β and 
δ are unknown parameters. Since the price series are 
monthly data, we used k = 12 lags [32] with a time trend.
The main hypothesis of interest is  H0: β = 0 versus  H1: 
β < 0 . Failure to reject  H0 indicates that the data series 
have a unit root and ought to be differenced. The test is 
one sided. The asymptotic distribution of the usual t sta-
tistic under  H0 is the augmented Dicky–Fuller distribu-
tion with critical values tabulated by Dicky and Fuller 
[31], Banerjee et al. [33], Cheung and Pascual [34] among 
others.
When the data are non-stationary, we follow Yang et al. 
[35] and use the difference of the logarithm of the prices 
to generate log price series. The log-differenced series is/
are:
where  PRt is the log-differenced series of the price series. 
With the log series, the CV is estimated in percentages.
Coefficient of variation (CV) and the corrected coefficient 
of variation (CCV)
Common approaches to measuring price volatility of 
agricultural outputs or food are the standard deviation 
and the coefficient of variation (CV) [36, 37]. The CV is 
the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean defined 
as [38]:
where P¯ is the mean of the (in the present case, price) 
series Pt, and n is the number of observations or data 
points.
The CV is a unit-free measure of variability [39] and 
is expressed as a percentage. It is applied in many disci-
plines [40]. The CV is also used to compare the variability 
of two series. Particularly, let period 1 be the policy-off 
period and period 2 the policy-on period. The hypoth-
esis to be tested is  CV1 = CV2 against—in the present 
(1)
�yt = α + βyt−1 + δt + ζ1�yt−1
+ ζ1�yt−2 · · · + ζk�yζt−k + εt
(2)PRt = ln(Pt)− ln(Pt−1)







case study—the alternative  CV1 > CV2, i.e., the CV for 
the policy-off period (market without buffer stock policy) 
is greater than the CV for the policy-on period (market 
with buffer stock policy).
The test statistic Z is [41]:
where α = √(n/(n− 1) with n the number of observa-
tions, S1 and S2 the standard deviations of price series 1 
and 2, respectively, P1 and P2 their means, and γ 21 and γ 22  
their variances. When the number of observation 
between the series is different, n is the average number 
of observations of the two series. The Z-statistic follows 
the standard normal distribution. Although we expect a 
dampening policy effect on price volatility, we neverthe-
less apply a two-sided test.
Although the CV is widely used, its ability to fully cap-
ture price volatility is limited as it assumes that the vari-
ance of the price series is constant over time [42]. This 
particularly so, if there is non-stationarity due to a unit 
root or random-walk behavior, then the use of the CV 
can lead to over-estimation of volatility. There are two 
options to overcome the non-stationarity issue: removing 
it by differencing, as outlined above, or by applying the 
corrected coefficient of variation (CCV) to the non-sta-
tionary data. The CCV, also called the Cuddy-Della Valle 
instability index [43–45], is a transformation of the CV. 
Bediane and Odjo [46] described the CCV as the trend-
corrected CV. According to Huchet-Bourdon [38], the 
CCV is defined as:
where R2 is the coefficient of determination obtained 
from the simple linear regression of the price series on 
time (t) using the same period for which the CV is esti-
mated. That is, R2 is the coefficient of determination of 
the time trend regression model [45]:
where a is the constant, β the slope, E the disturbance 
term and T denotes the endpoint of the estimation 
period. Ordinary least square (OLS) can be applied to 
estimate Eq. (6).
The difference between the CCVs of the price series for 
the policy-on and policy-off period can be tested by using 
the approaches developed by Deb and Pramanik [47] and 
Singh and Byerlee [48] which are based on Kendal and 




















(6)log (P) = a+ βt + ε where t = 1, 2, . . .T
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where D is:
where  CCV1 and  CCV2 relate to periods 1 (policy-off) 
and 2 (policy-off), respectively; CCV is the CCV for the 
parent population, that is, the series involving both the 
policy-off and policy-on periods; n1 and n2 are the num-
bers of observations for period 1 and period 2, respec-
tively. Deb et  al. [50] showed that Z follows a standard 
normal distribution. As in the case of CV, we apply a 
two-sided test.
In the application below, we apply both the CCV to the 
non-stationary data and the CV to the detrend data.
Empirical results
We analyze real monthly wholesale prices of maize and 
rice reported by the Ministry of Food and Agriculture of 
Ghana from three major cereal markets. These markets 
are Techiman and Tamale where the stabilization policy 
has been implemented, and Ho where this is not the case. 
The data cover the period January 2006–April 2015 giv-
ing a total of 112 data points. For Techiman and Tamale, 
the period from January 2006–2010 is the pre-buffer 
stock operation (policy-off) era and the period January 
2011–April 2015 the buffer stock era (policy-on). For 
the entire period January 2006–April 2015, there are no 
missing observations. The data are presented in Figs.  1, 
2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. For each series, we present two graphs: 
graphs a (at the left-hand side) show the (non-stationary) 
nominal level data and graphs b (at the right-hand side) 
the (stationary) data after log differencing.










The results of the augmented Dicky–Fuller (ADF) test 
are presented in Table 1.
The results of the ADF unit root test are presented in 
Table 1. The results indicate that the raw (level) data for 
all the price series for both maize and rice are non-sta-
tionary. After first differencing, all the series are station-
ary (1% level).
We first compare the policy-on and policy-off periods 
and markets by way of the CV for the differenced time 
(stationary) series (see section on methods). The between 
periods–within markets CVs are presented in Table  2 
and the corresponding one-tailed test results in Table 3. 
Table 4 presents the test results for the policy-on periods 
between markets. Comparisons by way of the CCV for 
the raw data are presented in Tables 5 and 6.
The results presented in Tables  2 and 3 indicate that 
the between period price volatility in the Techiman and 
Tamale markets declined for both commodities. For 
instance, in the Techiman market, the CV of the price of 
maize declined from 22.10% in period 1,15.01% in period 
2, and of rice from 16.77 to 4.97. For the Ho market, the 
between period CVs of both commodities also declined, 
though marginally only: of maize from 20.93 to 19.05 and 
of rice from 12.58 to 12.0.
The outcomes of the test results presented in Table  3 
support the results in Table 2. The changes in the CVs of 
maize in Techiman and Tamale, and of rice in Tamale are 
significant at 1%, and that of rice in Techiman at 5%. The 
changes in the CVs of both commodities in the Ho mar-
ket are insignificant. This means that in the Ho market, 
the volatility has not changed between the two periods. 
Comparison of the effects for the two crops in the Techi-
man market shows that the policy had a greater effect 


























Fig. 1 a, b Price of Maize from January 2006–April 2015 in Techiman market
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volatility (7.02). For the Tamale market, the difference is 
smaller.
Table  4 confirms the policy effects found in Tables  2 
and 3. For both commodities, the differences in CVs 
between the Techiman and Tamale markets on the one 
hand and of the Ho market on the other are significant at 
1%, except for maize between Techiman and Ho where it 
is significant at 5%.
The results of the CCV analyses presented in Tables 5 
and 6 are globally in line with the results of CV analyses 
in Tables 2, 3 and 4. Table 6 shows that there is a signifi-
cant (1% level) difference in the CCV between the policy-
on and policy-off for both crops in the Techiman market. 
For the Tamale market, the difference is significant (5%) 
for maize and marginally significant for rice. For the Ho 
market, the differences are insignificant. (Note that the 
time regression model (6) which is only needed for the R2 
in the CVV, is presented in “Appendix 1”).
Discussion
Overall, the study provides evidence that the buffer 
stock policy and dual pricing system have had mitigating 
effects on the price volatility of maize and rice. For both 
produces, we estimated the correlation coefficients (CV) 
based on the detrended time series and the corrected 
correlation coefficients (CCV) estimated on the raw data. 
For the Techiman market, the differences between the 



























































Fig. 3 a, b Price of Maize for January 2006–April 2015 in Tamale market














































































Fig. 6 a, b Price of Rice for January 2006–April 2015 in Ho market
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maize were found to be significant at 1% (in both the CV 
and CCV test). For the Tamale market, the difference 
between both periods for maize was significant at 1%, for 
rice at 5% (CV test); for maize, the difference was signifi-
cant at 5%, for rice at slightly less than 15% (CCV test). 
Apparently, the CCV test based on raw data is less con-
clusive than the CV test based on detrended data. Similar 
results were found by [44, 46]. For the Ho market with-
out buffer stocking, we failed to reject the hypothesis of 
no difference between periods 1 and 2 for both rice and 
maize (both CV and CCV tests). We also compared the 
Techiman and Tamale markets on the one hand and the 
Ho market on the other for period 2 for both commodi-
ties. The hypotheses of no difference between the policy-
on and the policy-off markets for both produces were 
rejected for both types of markets at 1% (both tests).
The results of the CV estimates provide evidence that 
the effect of the policy has generally been greater on rice 
than on maize as indicated by the higher CV changes 
for rice. Table  3 shows that the CV changes for maize 
and rice are 7.09 and 11.80% in the Techiman market, 
respectively, and 13.19 and 15.18% in the Tamale mar-
ket. The average proportions of maize and rice that enter 
the buffer stocks yearly are estimated at 7.2 and 12.5%, 
respectively [26]. With these proportions, the buffer 
stock operations are able to affect the supply and price of 
rice more than those of maize.
Table 3 furthermore indicates that that the policy has 
affected the price volatility of both crops in Tamale (CV 
change for rice: 15.18%, for maize: 13.19%) more than in 
Techiman where the corresponding percentages are 7.09 
and 11.80. The differential policy effects between Tamale 
(Northern Region) and Techiman (Brong Ahaho Region) 
could have been affected by the fact that Techiman is cen-
trally located in the country with relatively better roads 
to the farming communities compared to Tamale which 
is located in the northern part of the country with more 
remote farming communities. Due to its better infra-
structure and location, imports of both produces can 
reach the Techiman market more easily than the Tamale 
market which reduces the effects of buffer stocking in the 
former. Furthermore, the agro-ecological conditions are 
more favorable in Techiman than in Tamale for the pro-
duction of both commodities, especially maize [51]. This 
means that production volumes in Tamale are subject to 
more fluctuations than in Techiman with, ceteris paribus, 
larger policy impacts in the former.
Table 1 Results of the ADF test
Asymptotic critical values for unit root t test with linear time trend, 12 lags: 10%: 
− 2.58; 1%: − 3.51 (Banerjee et al. [33])
*Significant at 1%. A t statistic larger than the critical value implies rejection of 
 H0 and presence of a unit root
Market Price series ADF test
Levels First difference
Techiman Maize − 2.357 − 5.005*
Rice − 1.869 − 4.844*
Tamale Maize − 2.380 − 4.379*
Rice − 2.189 − 5.988*
Ho Maize − 2.344 − 4.394*
Rice − 1.485 − 4.200*
Table 2 Coefficients of variation (CV): between periods–within markets
The number of observations for the policy-off period is 59 and for the policy-on period 51
*For the Ho market, the first and second periods are not distinguished by policy intervention
Period Market Techiman market Tamale market Ho market*
Crop Maize Rice Maize Rice Maize Rice
Policy-off period Mean 0.290 0.355 0.258 0.339 0.434 0.542
SD 6.404 5.952 5.032 7.664 9.076 6.822
CV (%) 22.10 16.77 19.47 22.61 20.93 12.58
Policy-on period Mean 0.373 1.078 1.231 3.118 0.698 1.725
SD 5.591 5.355 7.728 23.149 13.297 21.046
CV (%) 15.01 4.97 6.28 7.43 19.05 12.20
Table 3 One-sided tests of   CV1 > CV2: between  periods–
within markets
**Significant at 1%; *Significant at 5%









Techiman Maize 22.10 15.01 7.09 5.220**
Techiman Rice 16.77 4.97 11.80 9.172**
Tamale Maize 19.47 6.28 13.19 11.488**
Tamale Rice 22.61 7.43 15.18 4.810*
Ho Maize 20.93 19.05 1.88 0.114
Ho Rice 12.58 12.20 0.38 0.025
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Our result is in line with Bryan’s [52] analysis of price 
volatility in 14 countries following the 2008 food cri-
sis. For instance, the Ethiopian government released its 
grain stocks directly to consumers through consumers’ 
associations organized at local levels to help mitigate the 
effects of the rising food prices at the time. Although the 
quantity was not sufficient to reduce overall domestic 
price levels in the entire country, the release significantly 
lowered local prices in several parts of the country, thus 
reducing price volatility.
The results are also in line with the findings of David 
et al. [13] who used the CV approach for food price vola-
tility analysis. The authors found a negative relationship 
between locally traded volumes of locally produced crops 
and the volatility of food prices in some a few Eastern 
African countries such as Kenya, Malawi, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe using strategies such as public buffer stock 
holdings and management. The results imply that coun-
tries that have created an economic environment that 
allows for rapid supply responses to demand tend to 
be successful in reducing price volatility of staple food 
crops. The results corroborate the findings of Abbott 
[53] who reported that after the 2008 food crisis, buffer 
stock operations that were introduced by countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa have helped to reduce the volatility of 
some staple food crops, especially cereals.
However, the study by Minot [8] raises questions about 
the effectiveness of food price stabilization programs like 
buffer stock operations being implemented by large state-
owned enterprises in sub-Sahara African countries like 
Zambia and Zimbabwe, especially for maize. In spite of 
the operations, price volatility of maize was significantly 
higher in some of these countries than in other African 
Table 4 One-sided CV tests between  markets (policy-on 
periods only)
Crop Techiman Tamale Ho Difference Z-Statistics
Maize 15.01 6.28 – 8.73 5.216**
15.01 – 19.05 4.04 1.690*
– 6.28 19.05 12.77 5.689**
Rice 4.79 7.43 – 2.64 0.535
4.79 – 12.20 7.41 5.195**
7.43 12.20 4.77 2.811**
Table 5 Corrected coefficients of variation (CCV) of raw data: between periods–within markets
**Significant at 1%; *Significant at 5%
Market Techiman market Tamale market Ho market
Crop Maize Rice Maize Rice Maize Rice
Policy-off period (January 
2006–December 2010)
Constant 14.322 23.430 15.522 20.003 22.246 29.44
Coefficient 0.451 0.404 0.506 0.319 0.599 0. 576
S.E 0.067 0. 060 0. 067 0.060 0. 088 0.051
R2 0.435 0.438 0.497 0.326 0.442 0.686
CCV 0.319 0.223 0.287 0.269 0.290 0.145
Policy-on (January 2011–
April 2015)
Constant 57.856 57.192 39.593 19.224 46.290 65.962
Coefficient − 0.066 0.740 0.921 0.255 1.734 1.908
S.E 0.077 0.068 0.131 0.252 0. 260 0.206
R2 0.014 0.703 0.499 0.672 0.472 0.632
CCV 0.148 0.095 0.219 0.311 0.302 0.189
Table 6 One-sided tests of  CCV1 > CCV2 of raw data: between periods–within markets
**Significant at 1%; *Significant at 5%
Market Crop Policy-off CCV Policy-on CCV Change in CCV Z-statistics P value
Techiman Maize 0.319 0.148 0.171 5.191** 0.000
Techiman Rice 0.223 0.095 0.128 5.863** 0.000
Tamale Maize 0.287 0.219 0.068 1.889* 0.029
Tamale Rice 0.269 0.311 0.042 1.520 0.064
Ho Maize 0.290 0.302 0.012 0.279 0.780
Ho Rice 0.145 0.168 0.023 1.071 0.285
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countries with little or no price stabilization programs 
or policies for maize. This could be because the former 
countries had inherently more unstable food markets [8].
Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to analyze the effects of 
buffer stock operations on the price volatility of maize 
and rice in some selected markets in Ghana. Based on 
times series data obtained from the Ministry of Food 
and Agriculture spanning the period from January 2006 
to April 2015, we employed the (corrected) coefficient of 
variation as measures of volatility. The results show that 
price volatility of maize and rice was stabilized in the 
markets where the output price stabilization policy was 
implemented. For the same crops, price volatility was 
persistent in a market where the policy was absent. With 
these findings, we conclude that the buffer stock opera-
tions have been quite successful to control the price vola-
tility of maize and rice. The findings of this study provide 
an appeal for scaling up of the policy to other parts of the 
country, especially remote areas, where maize and rice 
production are intensive, yet access to these areas by buy-
ers are challenging.
A crucial condition for the policy to be effective is the 
proportion of the production volume that enters into 
buffer stock. Too small a proportion renders the policy 
ineffective. Benin et al. [26] argued that the proportion is 
critical for the policy to be effective and sustainable. As 
a rule of thumb, the authors recommend about 27% for 
Ghana.
An important side effect of the buffer stock operations 
is that they provide traders, individual farmers and their 
organizations with secure, and reliable storage which is 
crucial for the quality and price of the produce sold when 
prices are high. Moreover, reliable and safe storage pro-
vides farmers with credible title to their produce which 
enables them to obtain credit for their activities from 
the government but also from the private sector [54–
56]. Reliable storage creates a warehouse receipt system 
(WRS) that enables smallholder farmers to access credit 
due to improved security for loan recovery.
The study also highlights the importance of buffer 
stocks as a tool for implementing crop insurance pro-
grams [57], especially with the involvement of the pri-
vate sector. To hedge farmers against the risks posed by 
adverse weather conditions, destruction by pests such 
as armyworms and disease outbreaks which have the 
potential to cause farmers huge losses, weather index-
based crop insurance programs may be facilitated with 
buffer stock providing storage systems. If farmers have 
access to market based-insurance tools, variations in the 
production and prices may not require immediate policy 
response by government unless characterized by cata-
strophic events. Moreover, with the involvement of the 
private sector, farmers will have different packages of 
insurance programs to choose from to minimize risk. It 
is expected that with stable output prices, the income of 
farmers will improve and stimulate smallholder farmers 
to invest into increasing  their farm outputs [58].
Finally, the results of the study lend insight into direc-
tions for future research, particularly to find out the 
extent to which the gains made through the stabilizations 
of prices of maize and rice affect the welfare of the small-
holder farmers and their families including their health. It 
is after this that more comprehensive conclusions can be 
drawn on the real impacts of the policy-on smallholder 
farming in Ghana.
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